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Abstract—Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack is a ma-
jor concern for secure embedded devices [1]–[3]. Currently
proposed countermeasures [4]–[10] to prevent DPA imposes
signiﬁcant area, power and performance overheads. In addition
they either require special standard cell library and design
ﬂows or algorithmic modiﬁcations. Recently, Random Dynamic
Voltage and Frequency Scaling (RDVFS) has been proposed
[11] as a DPA countermeasure, which has less area, power
and performance overheads and it does not require special cell
library nor design ﬂows nor algorithmic modiﬁcations. However,
in a synchronous digital circuit, the operating frequency can be
detected by monitoring glitches on the power line. In this paper,
we show that using this information, it is possible to mount a
DPA attack on circuits employing RDVFS countermeasure. We
propose an alternative technique which only varies the supply
voltage randomly. Experimental results on AES core with SPICE
level simulations show that our proposed method signiﬁcantly
weakens the DPA attack by reducing the correlation of power to
processed data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is becoming an important metric along with cost,
performance and power consumption in embedded systems
such as smart-cards, PDAs and pay TV [1]. A typical crypto-
graphic algorithm is used to implement the secure part, usually
refereed to as a cryptographic device. A cryptographic device
can be part of an embedded system (pay TV, PDA) or a system
on its own (smart card). In either case, the whole system has to
be secure and protect its contents - mainly its data and secret
keys.
Traditional cryptanalysis (attempt to circumvent the security
of a cryptographic algorithm) is based on observation of inputs
and outputs of the cryptographic device. The cryptanalyst
(usually referred to as ‘attacker’) would attempt to extract the
‘secret key’ based on these observations and some knowledge
of the implemented algorithms. This has led to the devel-
opment of mathematically more ‘secure’ algorithms, such as
AES [12], where extracting the secret keys based on the input-
output relation is extremely difﬁcult.
Even though the algorithm is secure from a mathematical
point of view, its hardware implementation leaks some infor-
mation through power consumption, time of execution, elec-
tromagnetic radiation, etc. that can be utilised in extracting the
secret key. In the jargon of the cryptography, such information
is known as ‘side channel information’ and the attacks based
on this are called Side Channel Attacks. One such type of
side channel information is the power consumption of the
cryptographic device. Attacks based on the power consumption
are known as Power Analysis Attacks. Differential Power
Analysis (DPA), ﬁrst published by Kocher [2], is one type
of Power Analysis Attack where statistical techniques are
used to ﬁnd the secret key. DPA attacks can be successful
and DPA countermeasures are a major concern for secure
embedded systems [3]. As a result, researchers have developed
several DPA countermeasures [4]–[10], [13]. Although some
of these countermeasures have been reported successful, their
implementation incurs high area and power overheads [4]–
[10]. In this paper, we investigate area and power efﬁcient
countermeasures employing Random Dynamic Voltage and
Frequency Scaling proposed in [11]. Using SPICE simulations,
we ﬁnd serious limitations for this approach. We propose an
alternative Random Voltage Scaling approach and evaluate our
method on a test circuit by implementing DPA attack.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section II
discusses previous work. Section III introduces our DPA ﬂow
and test circuit. In this section we implement a DPA attack on
test circuit and use these results to compare countermeasures.
In Section IV we show that by ﬁnding the operating frequency,
one can still successfully attack an algorithm employing Ran-
dom Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling. In Section V
we propose to keep the frequency constant and randomly vary
voltage and show its effectiveness against DPA. In Section VI
we discuss conclusions and future work.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
Successful DPA attacks on cryptographic implementation
were reported in [3], [14]. As a result, a number of coun-
termeasures to DPA have been proposed. DPA countermea-
sures on the algorithmic level include random masking of
intermediate variables [4], [13]. These are platform-dependent
countermeasures and require a substantial processing time
overhead, increased power consumption and area.
On the hardware side, system level techniques include
adding noise to the device power consumption through ad-
ditional logic [5], which need circuit-level modiﬁcations and
requires more area. Bucci et al [6] proposed a random pre-
charging countermeasure to prevent DPA which adds noise to
the device power consumption through random pre-charging
and showed that this countermeasure was able to reduce the
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prevent DPA. However this countermeasure has less area,
power and processing overheads when compared to other
methods and is an attractive method to integrate with other
countermeasures to prevent DPA.
Gate level countermeasures are based on masking at gate-
level. These gate-level cells can be made available through
a library of masked standard cells. These cell’s power con-
sumption will be uncorrelated to processed data [7], however
these countermeasures have large area, power consumption
and performance overheads.
A transistor level approach to prevent DPA is based on
the adoption of a logic family whose power consumption is
independent of the processed data such as [8]–[10]. Counter-
measures based on logic design styles (transistor-level) have
good security characteristics, but they tend to be expensive in
terms of area, performance and power consumption. Moreover
countermeasures based on logic design styles need a custom
design approach thus increasing design time and costs.
Yang et al [11] proposed Dynamic Voltage and Frequency
Scaling as a countermeasure to prevent DPA by altering
voltage and frequency randomly, thus reducing the corre-
lation of input data to the power consumed. We call the
technique used in [11] Random Dynamic Voltage Scaling
(RDVFS) to avoid confusion with normal Dynamic Voltage
and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) technique [15]. The difference
between RDVFS and DVFS is that RDVFS randomly scales
voltage and frequency to randomise the power consumption,
whereas DVFS scales voltage and frequency to save power
consumption. In both DVFS and RDVFS the voltage and
frequency {Vdd,f} pairs are same, i.e. if f is changed Vdd
is changed accordingly.
The main advantage of RDVFS as a DPA countermeasure is
that it does not need the cryptographic algorithm to be altered
nor its implementation design ﬂow. As RDVFS does not pro-
cess random data (like masking countermeasure) nor includes
complementary logic styles (like transistor-level countermea-
sures) to prevent DPA, its area and power overhead are less.
However Yang et al [11] did not verify the effectiveness of
RDVFS by implementing a DPA attack. In Section IV we
evaluate RDVFS by implementing DPA attack on a test circuit.
It is well know fact that security comes at a price. Every
countermeasure so far presented has some overhead. Some
of them higher than other. Although transistor level counter-
measures are shown to be very secure, they require special
design ﬂows and require special attention to routing, to balance
the routing capacitance on both the complementary outputs.
Similarly gate level countermeasures need special standard
cells and hence require a semi custom design ﬂow. Algorithmic
countermeasures only modify the algorithm and do not require
special design ﬂow, but these solutions are speciﬁc and are
not portable. Designers of secure devices have to trade-off
security against device cost (implementation and overhead
costs). For some applications combining more than one low
implementation cost countermeasure might be attractive than
using a high implementation cost countermeasure.
III. DPA ATTACK FLOW AND TEST CIRCUIT
To perform a DPA attack, the attacker ﬁrst chooses ’N’
plain text (inputs to the cryptographic device), then measures
the actual power consumption of cryptographic device in
operation for ’N’ (round limit) encryption rounds and stores
this information with respect to plain text or cipher text
[P1,P2,...PN]. Here encryption round or round is referred
to as one plain text (input) to cipher text (output) operation,
not AES internal rounds. Then he/she predicts the power
consumption for each possible key for the same plain text,
refered to as Hypothetical power consumption. For example,
[H11,H12,...H1N] for key 1, [H21,H22,...H2N] for key
2 and so on. Note that the Hypothetical (predicted) power
consumption does not necessarily represent exact values, it is
the relative difference between them that is important [16]. The
attacker then correlates the Hypothetical power consumption
([Hi1,Hi2,...HiN]) of each key to that of the actual power
consumption ([P1,P2,...PN]). Correlation for the actual key
would be higher than the other keys. The detailed theory
behind the Power analysis attacks has been presented in [2],
[16]. As DPA relies on statistical analysis, the quality of
analysis increases with ‘N’ (number of encryptions).
To compare the effectiveness of a countermeasure, we
implemented DPA on a AES [12] test circuit without any
countermeasures. Our AES architecture was similar to the one
in [3]. Our AES circuit was implemented on AMS 0.35µm
technology. Simulations have been done on a SPICE netlist
without routing parasitics (to increase simulator speed) using
the fast spice simulator Nanosim from Synopsys [17]. To limit
the time spent on simulation, encryption rounds of 10,000
(round limit) has been chosen. This simulation, which was
run on a workstation running RHEL4 on AMD Opetron 246
with 1Gb memory, took about 25 hours of CPU time.
The simulated data is then processed through software
developed by the authors to implement a DPA attack. As
shown in Fig 1, this software has three main modules: 1) A
pre-processing and partitioning tool which can pre-process and
partition the simulation results 2) A generic test bench with
customisable key hypothesis, when simulated with RTL/Gate
level model of circuit under test generates hypothetical power
consumption, and ﬁnally 3) The Statistical analysis module
which can perform ‘Pearson Correlation’ analysis [3] and ‘Dif-
ference of Mean’ analysis [2]. Although this ﬂow is presently
targeted towards the AES algorithm, because of its generic
and modular nature it can be adopted to any algorithm and
design ﬂow. Particularly, DPA check can be done before and
after place & route, enabling us to check for DPA resistance
early in the design ﬂow.
The DPA attack on the above AES circuit was targeted on
the 8 MSB’s (most signiﬁcant bits) and the corresponding
hypothetical power consumption was generated. The power
analysis attack we implemented was similar to the one de-
scribed in [3]. As expected the correct 8 key bits, 167 in
our case, were found. The DPA result plot for two different
numbers of encryption rounds (round limit), 1000 and 10,000,
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is shown in Fig 2. The X-axis represents all possible key values
(0 to 255) and the Y-axis represents correlation of a particular
key’s hypothetical power consumption to the actual power
consumption. The key with highest correlation represents the
correct key. It is also important to note that the absolute value
of correlation for the correct key is not important, it is the
relative value from other possible keys. As it can be seen in
Fig 2, the correct key value was detected for 10,000 encryption
rounds but not for 1000 encryption rounds. For our AES test
circuit a minimum of 2500 rounds was needed to differentiate
the correct key, i.e. for the correlation of correct key to be
signiﬁcantly higher than the correlation of other possible keys.
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Fig. 2. DPA result of AES for 10,000 and 1000 encryption rounds, based
on SPICE simulation using Nanosim
Because of the circuit complexity (and hence time) to
simulate the entire AES circuit we choose a part of AES, the
Sbox shown in Fig 3, to experiment on. Sbox is designed in
combinational logic as described in [18]. Hypothetical power
consumption is chosen as a function of toggling activity at
the register R2. ‘N’ (encryption rounds) of 10,000 input plain
texts have been applied to check DPA proof. Here encryption
round refers to one input to output operation. This number has
been arbitrarily chosen so that the encryption rounds should
be large enough to get accurate results without dramatically
increasing the simulation time. Although this circuit is trivial
when compared to the complete AES system, it enables us
to see the effectiveness of a countermeasure in a shorter
simulation time. Moreover as the there is no other logic
(circuit) operating in parallel in the Sbox circuit, the power
consumption observed would have less noise than in AES
circuit (as there is more logic operating at a given time in
AES), thus any countermeasure proved against this circuit
should work for the entire AES as well. The effect of noise
can be clearly seen in Fig 4, the correct key detected for Sbox
has much higher correlation value when compared to the DPA
result on the entire AES in Fig 2.
Fig. 3. Test Circuit 2 - AES Sbox.
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Fig. 4. DPA result for 10000 rounds on AES Sbox without any countermea-
sure.
IV. DPA ON CIRCUITS EMPLOYING RDVFS
Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) is an
effective approach to reduce energy [15]. DVFS utilises the
fact that the power P is directly proportional to the clock
frequency f and to the square of the supply voltage Vdd.
P ∝ f · V 2
dd. In DVFS, scaling of supply voltage and clock
frequency takes place dynamically to adjust to performance
demand. Each such power-performance mode has a {Vdd,f}-
pair, which are predetermined. It is important to note that
frequency and voltage are both changed together as a pair
and both these values are related. Yang et al [11] proposed to
randomly vary voltage Vdd and frequency f to prevent DPA
(RDVFS). This technique is similar to DVFS in that both vary
voltage and frequency dynamically. Except RDVFS aim is to
prevent DPA whereas DVFS aim is to reduce energy.
DVFS has been generally used with microprocessors to
reduce overall power consumption, in the DPA context RDVFS
as a DPA countermeasure is of interest to both microprocessors
and ASICs. In order to check the effect of RDVFS on DPA,
we implemented RDVFS on AES Sbox. Although our circuit
is trivial when compared to a microprocessor, it enables us to
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The {Vdd,f}-pairs have been arbitrarily chosen to bring in
randomness. We assumed frequency and voltage change values
instantly and are modelled as piecewise linear source in
our SPICE simulations. We implemented a DPA attack as
discussed in Section III and found that we could not ﬁnd the
key, this DPA result is shown in Fig 5.
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Fig. 5. DPA on Sbox with DVFS countermeasure
Most of the circuits used today are sequential, employing
ﬂip-ﬂops and latches, i.e. circuit operation is synchronised to
a single clock pulse. Thus at the rising (or falling) edge of
a clock pulse, there will be a burst of operation (transistors
switching) which will settle down towards the end of the
clock period. Current consumed at the rising edge of clock
pulse will thus be higher and goes down along with switching
activity. This can be clearly observed in the Fig 6. From
this it is clear that a change in frequency can be easily
detected by observing the power consumption trace. Based
on this, we observed the power consumption trace of Sbox
employing RDVFS and recorded the circuit frequency for
each input applied. By knowing the frequency, we found
the voltage by looking at the voltage frequency {Vdd,f}-
pairs. We changed our hypothetical power consumption to
reﬂect the changes in frequency and voltage. With this new
hypothetical power consumption we performed DPA attack on
the same circuit, this time our attack was successful. Although
we could not ﬁnd an automated way to determine frequency
from power consumption, this experiment shows that it is
possible to implement DPA attack on systems employing the
RDVFS countermeasure, where frequency and voltage values
are related.
V. RANDOM SUPPLY VOLTAGE VARIATION AS DPA
COUNTERMEASURE
As we showed in Section IV countermeasures that depend
on varying the frequency are susceptible to DPA. Since fre-
quency is easily detectable, one approach to overcome this
would be to randomly change the supply voltage while keeping
the frequency constant, such that the circuit is operational
under all possible supply voltages as shown in 7(a). A sim-
pliﬁed block diagram of the proposed method is shown in
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Fig. 6. Power consumption with respect to clock pulse
Fig 7(b). The additional blocks required are a true random
number generator (RNG) and a voltage controller. RNGs
already exists for secure smart card applications and are not
additional overhead. A voltage controller is the only additional
block required for this countermeasure. Beneﬁt in this type of
countermeasure is that it can be applied to a custom ASIC
or a general Micro controller, without modiﬁcation to the
algorithm or its design ﬂow (unlike masking countermeasures
or gate level countermeasures). The main restriction of our
proposed method is that the attacker should not have access
to any of these blocks directly, i.e. if the connection between
RNG and Voltage controller is cut off, then there would be no
randomness in the power consumption.
(a) Voltage and Frequency re-
lationship.
(b) Block diagram of our pro-
posed method.
Fig. 7. Our proposed method.
As we propose to vary the voltage, the maximum limit of
Vdd (Vdd max), the minimum limit of Vdd (Vdd min) and the
frequency of change of Vdd (dvs rate) affect the DPA result.
This section discusses these parameters and their effect on
DPA. For our countermeasure to work effectively, the change
in power consumed (δvoltage) due to a change in Voltage (Vdd)
should be close to change in power consumed (δswitching) due
to a change in input (or switching activity). This is explained
below.
Let [In1,In2,In3,In4,In5,In6] be a set of input vec-
tors and [P11,P12,P13,P14,P15,P16] power consumed per
input at voltage Vdd1 and [P21,P22,P23,P24,P25,P26]
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and [P31,P32,P33,P34,P35,P36] for Vdd3. For a con-
stant Vdd, the attacker can easily correlate the hypothetical
power model and the actual power consumption to deter-
mine the key. But if the voltage was varied after input In2
and In4, then the resultant power consumption would be
[P11,P12,P23,P24,P35,P36] (assuming a change in supply
voltage would take much less time when compared to the time
to process each input). This would signiﬁcantly reduce the
correlation between input data and power consumption, as the
difference in P12 − P13 is not same as P12 − P23. This
can be seen as introducing randomness in power consumption.
For this countermeasure to be effective, the difference in
P12 − P23 should be equal to P11 − P12 or P13 − P14
or P14 − P25 or P15 − P26. i.e. a change in Vdd should
manifest itself as a change in input. But ﬁnding Vdd1, Vdd2 and
Vdd3 values to satisfy the above condition would be difﬁcult
as the inputs to the system can be any value (and are usually
unknown). Moreover these values cannot be generalised, as
the inputs (switching activity) and the voltage range vary from
system to system.
The rate of change of voltage (dvs rate) should be much
less than the time to process the minimum number of inputs
to successfully mount a DPA attack. For our test circuit
AES, the minimum number of encryption rounds required to
successfully implement a DPA attack was 2500. If dvs rate
is close to the above number, then the attacker could simply
implement a DPA attack, before the randomness is introduced.
The amount of randomness in power consumption can be
increased by increasing the available voltage range. i.e, if
Vdd min and Vdd max are close to each other then the amount
of randomness is less and if this range is more, randomness is
more. Bo Zhai et al [15] discussed the limits of voltage scaling
and showed that digital circuits can work even in the sub-
threshold region. Since we propose to keep the frequency to
the lowest possible, selecting the Vdd min will be constrained
by the expected circuit speed. However to overcome such a
limitation, one could increase Vdd max to increase the overall
range at the expense of higher power consumption.
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Fig. 8. DPA result for Vdd max of 3.7v and Vdd min of 1.6v for dvs rate
of 200.
To test the effect of voltage variation on DPA we ﬁrst simu-
lated AES Sbox (in Fig 3) with Vdd max of 3.3v and Vdd min of
3.0v and found that the correlation strength was lowered when
compared to the Sbox without any countermeasure. When we
increased the range, Vdd max of 3.7v and Vdd min of 1.6v, the
correlation strength was lowered by at least 5 times, shown
in Fig 8. We assumed that change in supply voltage is done
instantly without any delay. While this assumption is not
realistic, it quickly enables us to check the effectiveness of
countermeasure, without affecting the quality of experiment.
Fig 8 shows these results for dvs rate of 10 to 1000. The
X-axis represents dvs rate and the Y-axis represents highest
correlation value, second correlation value and their respective
keys. From Fig 9 it is clear that the the correlation is reduced
by 5 times for all the dvs rate considered (10 to 1000).
More importantly, the difference between the correct key’s
correlation and incorrect key’s correlation has been reduced
by 10 times.
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Fig. 9. DPA result for Vdd max of 3.7v and Vdd min of 1.6v for different
dvs rate.
Fig 10 shows the effect of the available Vdd range for
dvs step of 0.1v on DPA. It can be clearly seen that as
this range (number of available Vdd to vary) increases, the
correlation of the signal decreases. However for the set of
experiments we conducted, the correlation of signal was never
below a point where the secret key was undetectable.
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Fig. 10. DPA result for different Vdd ranges
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reduce simulation time, however it is unlikely to be possible
to observe only the power consumption of a part of the crypto-
system (circuit). To get a good estimate of our countermeasure
on the entire AES, we simulated the entire AES with a
Vdd min of 2.8v, Vdd max of 3.7v and a dvs step of 0.1v for
10,000 encryptions (round limit). We found that for 10,000
encryptions the countermeasure was effective, the result is
shown in Fig 11. However as DPA was successful on the
Sbox circuit with our countermeasure, we conclude that our
proposed method signiﬁcantly increases the required number
of encryptions rounds to mount DPA. As our method does not
require the underlying algorithm or its logic to be altered, it
is an ideal choice to be applied with other countermeasures to
prevent DPA. Countermeasures such as Random pre-charging
[6], which have been shown to have less overheads but are not
entirely secure against DPA can be used with our proposed
method to prevent DPA and can be a cost saving alternative
than using a high overhead countermeasure such as [8], [10],
which require custom design ﬂows.
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Fig. 11. DPA result of AES with a Vdd min of 2.8v and Vdd max of 3.7v
VI. CONCLUSION
We have discussed the limitations of RDVFS as a coun-
termeasure for DPA. The operating frequency is detectable
by monitoring glitches on the power supply. Our experiments
indicate that this information can be successfully exploited by
a DPA attacker and it severely compromises the the effective-
ness of the proposed RDVFS countermeasure. We propose an
alternative technique which randomly varies only the supply
voltage while keeping the frequency constant. Our proposed
method, when applied for encryption rounds of 10,000 to an
AES Sbox, could lower the correlation strength by 10 times
and when applied to the complete AES, the secret key was
indistinguishable, and prevents the DPA attack. Our method
does not require the underlying algorithm or its logic to be
altered, which enables us to apply other countermeasures, such
as [6], which have also been shown to reduce the correlation.
We will direct our future work to implementing the entire
circuit i.e. AES, random number generator and voltage regu-
lator and to see the effect on DPA of combining our proposed
method with other countermeasures.
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